THE PRIVATIZATION mantra is being
incessantly hummed by the Aquino III administration. Privatization is
being promoted to the public as the solution to deteriorated,
broken-down and inadequate public utilities and social services. The
argument is not new: government just doesn’t have the resources to
provide for these public goods. Coupled with this line is the
conventional wisdom that governments are prone to mismanagement and
corruption so much so that only private capital investment and
management could solve the problem.
Thus the so-called public-private
partnership or PPP has become the centerpiece economic program of Mr.
Aquino. He, however, is merely taking a leaf from his mother, former
President Corazon Aquino, who implemented the first
build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme for the power sector in the country
in 1987 when the Philippine economy was subject to the conditionalities
of the structural adjustment programs laid down by the International
Monetary Fund. PPP projects are basically BOTs with a new, fancier
title.
The privatization of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Service
(MWSS) in 1997 is considered to be the country’s showcase for such
schemes. It was the largest water privatization project in the world at
the time costing close to $8 billion. The Ramos government touted the
project as the answer to the water crisis in Metro Manila and adjoining
areas promising lower rates, better quality water, universal coverage
and a more efficient use of scarce water resources. Filipino firms owned
by the Ayalas and Lopezes (and later, the Consunjis and MV Pangilinan
group of companies when the Lopezes divested) partnered with foreign
investors from the US, France, UK, the Netherlands, Japan and China/Hong
Kong to successfully bid for these contracts.
The move was immediately met with opposition, spearheaded by the MWSS
Employees’ Union who unjustly stood to be displaced by privatization,
supported by consumers who anticipated higher water rates once this
vital public service is subjected to the bottom line of big business --
profit.
In two years’ time however, water rates began their steady and steep
climb, especially so with rate rebasing that took place every five
years. By the 1st quarter of 2013, water rates were 7-12 times higher
than pre-privatization rates. This year the rate increase is already
under negotiation between MWSS, the government regulatory body, and the
two concessionaires: Manila Water is asking for an increase of the basic
charge by ₱5.38 per cubic meter (m3); Maynilad, by ₱10.30. Together
with other charges such as 12% VAT, environment charge and foreign
currency differential adjustment, this adds up to a hefty increase of
₱7.81/m3 for Manila Water and ₱13.71/m3 for Maynilad.
What does this mean for consumers? According to the national democratic
alliance, BAYAN, one way to look at it is to compute the increase in
monthly water bills for a low monthly consumption of 10 m3 and a "high"
of 30 m3. This rate hike will range from ₱78.10 to ₱234.30 for Manila
Water and ₱137.10 to ₱411.30 for Maynilad per month. But the real impact
is revealed by comparing such increases with family incomes, especially
of the more economically disadvantaged.
To illustrate, assuming the daily minimum wage in the National Capital
Region (NCR)is at ₱419-456, the water bill to be charged by Maynilad for
10 m3 monthly consumption would be 3-4% of an ordinary worker’s
earnings while it would be 2-3 % for Manila Water. At 30 m3
consumption, the figures are 10-11% for the former, 7-8% for the latter.
Such calculations were confirmed to even be underestimated in a study
conducted by the policy research outfit IBON in four urban poor
communities in NCR. Water connections cost anywhere between ₱1,300 and
₱10,000 and effective water rates are ₱20-75/m3 (for sub-metered
connections) and ₱63-₱333/m3 (for water bought in containers). The
community is populated by kasambahay or household workers,
pedicab/tricycle/jeepney drivers, construction workers, vendors,
security guards and janitors with daily earnings of ₱100-400 or
₱3,000-12,000 monthly. The portion of their earnings that goes to paying
for water is anywhere between 7-22% (at an income ₱100-150/day) and
3-15% (income ₱300-350/day).
Quite starkly, the wealthy households in Ayala Heights, Quezon City pay
roughly the same rates as those in the slum area nearby who are
fortunately connected to the water main. Those poorer households that
make do with sub-meters pay several pesos more per cubic meter
consumption while those who pay for water by the balde containers
pay three to five times more. Thus the poor have to pay for their water
at astoundingly higher rates than the rich do because the water reaches
them through middle men.
Which brings us to ask what ever happened to the private
concessionaires’ claims that they had achieved close to a hundred
percent coverage of their franchise areas? According to IBON, the most
recent representative survey data for access to safe water in the entire
country including NCR is from the 2008 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
which makes it difficult to cross check the water concessionaires’
claims. (It is also an unflattering indication of how assiduous is the
government in compiling data relevant and necessary to its regulatory
function.)
Nonetheless, the official data shows that upon privatization (1997), the
percentage of families without access to safe water was 12.2%. Post
privatization (2008), it stood at 8.4%. On the other hand, the rising
absolute numbers of households without access to safe water, from
201,117 to 204,036, is cause for alarm.
BAYAN says that not all households have individual connections; in urban
poor communities, most rely on bulk meter connections that result in
higher rates. In many areas water pressure is low such that water flows
only at specified, and even ungodly, hours. In fact the physical
infrastructure for water supply in many areas still appear to be
antiquated resulting to the bursting of water mains that caused flash
floods in thoroughfares and residential areas such as those at EDSA in
2010, Las PiƱas in 2012 and Mandaluyong in 2013. It would be useful for a
study to be made comparing the incidence of water-borne diseases in NCR
pre- and post-privatization.
Most useful data culled by IBON is the robust profits garnered by
Maynilad and Manila Water from 2008-2011, a 44% average annual increase
for Maynilad and 15% for Manila Water. In fact the two water companies
have been able to expand: Manila Water owns Boracay Island Water, Clark
Water, Laguna Water and Kehn Dong Water Supply at Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam; Ayala & Pangilinan, for their part, have cornered the Cebu
Bulk Water project.
To check whether the water firms’ profits are indeed quite healthy,
perhaps even unconscionable from the point of view that the commodity
they are profiting from is one so vital to life, health and wellbeing,
IBON estimated their respective rates of return on equity (ROE) or how
much the company is earning from funds invested by its stockholders:
Maynilad’s is 48%; Manila Water, 19%. These figures are reportedly
higher than those of companies in the telecommunications, power and
mining industries.
At the end of the day, this only underscores that with privatization,
water firms controlled by the biggest names in the local and foreign
business community are raking in their profits and government gets its
similarly gargantuan tax revenue, while the poorest and middle-income
households are bled dry.
With the privatization of water services considered to be the model for
the PPP program of the Aquino regime, the common tao is in for a lot
more hardship and misery, all for the glory of private profit. Looming
just around the corner is the privatization of government hospitals,
starting with the National Orthopedic Hospital.
It is as if we are not suffering enough from the unending increases in
electric power rates and oil and gasoline prices, the Aquino regime
would want us to believe that the best this government can offer is more
of the same.
source: Businessworld's Streetwise by Carol Araullo
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